State v. Engel
What's at Stake
The Minnesota Supreme Court is poised to decide whether there are any circumstances in which someone subjected to an unconstitutional traffic stop can suppress evidence that he temporarily avoided the police when they initiated the unconstitutional stop. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that evidence of even temporary “flight” can never be suppressed—even when someone simply delays acquiescing to an unconstitutional traffic stop—on the theory that fleeing from the police is a crime. The Ƶ’s State Supreme Court Initiative, along with the Ƶ of Minnesota and the law firm Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, filed an amicus brief arguing that Article I, Sections 8 and 10 of the Minnesota Constitution—which guarantee Minnesotans remedies for constitutional violations and protect them from unreasonable searches and seizures—require a broad application of the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we argue that the Court should use a flexible, multi-factor test that can allow for suppression of evidence where a suspect, as in this case, responds to an illegal stop or seizure with nonviolent attempts to keep himself safe.
Summary
When police attempted to illegally stop defendant Nicholas Engel on a dark rural road, he put off stopping until he reached a better-lit location where it was more probable that witnesses would observe the illegal traffic stop. The evidence of this “flight” was then used to charge Mr. Engel with a crime, turning Mr. Engel’s understandable reaction to a baseless stop into a basis for prosecuting him. The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the use of Mr. Engel’s “flight” as evidence, invoking a blanket rule that evidence of a “new crime” committed after an unlawful stop cannot be excluded.
Our amicus brief argues for a broad application of the exclusionary rule and the use of a flexible, multi-factor test to determine whether suppression is warranted. Typically, in deciding whether to suppress evidence as “fruit of the poisonous tree” following an illegal stop, Minnesota courts have applied the balancing test from State v. Weekes, 312 Minn. 1, 3, 250 N.W.2d 590, 592 (1977). The test considers (1) the time between the illegality and the evidence alleged to be part of that illegality, (2) any intervening circumstances, (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct, and (4) whether the evidence would have been obtained without the illegality.
As we explain in our brief, Mr. Engel’s case shows why the contextual four-factor test is appropriate and why a blanket rule prohibiting suppression is a poor fit for cases of “mere flight” that seek to facilitate a safe police stop. Mr. Engel’s conduct is markedly different from the defendants’ conduct in the cases on which the Court of Appeals relied, which involved physical resistance, violent police assault, or threats to obstruct legal process. Mr. Engel did not fully flee an illegal traffic stop; instead, he simply delayed the stop by driving to a location where he felt that he would be safer from any further violations of his legal rights. Applying the Weekes factors to evidence of flight from an illegal stop would allow courts to recognize cases, such as this one, where Minnesotans merely seek non-violent ways to protect themselves from the harms of illegal searches and seizures.